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 Abstract  
Why is there such a discrepancy between legal time and historical time? Or rather, 
whose historical time is tacitly represented and silently justified in legal representations? 
Whose interests are served by the law’s particular fictions and whose injuries are 
privileged? In exploring these questions I will focus on the 2006 case of In re African-
American Slave Descendants, a claim made for reparations for slavery in the U.S. Since 
the 1980s a number of litigants have filed claims for injuries arising out of slavery and 
none has succeeded, but these very failures are worth examining for what they reveal 
about the contemporary inability to reconcile the demands of the past on the present. 
Throughout the twentieth century, historians challenged the idea that we have 
transparent access to historical truths, which has obvious implications for the status of the 
legal text; and yet the law itself has remained largely untouched by these insights. 
However, I argue that reparations cases can be read as theorising a new relationship 
between law and history, and as interventions in the law’s logic of time. Reparations 
claims intercept legal logic in at least two important ways: first, by insisting on the 
continuing damage of slavery, the claims defy positivist representations of history and 
time; and second, in their reliance on the legal fiction of corporate identity across time, 
these cases allude to the interconnected history of the fictions of corporate and slave 
identities, and potentially rework these fictions in the direction of social justice. 
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  ‘Within the text of the law there is an afterlife of slavery … as matters of aesthetic and 
legal representation … as an aesthetics of legal representation’ 
—Stephen Best (2004: 14).   
 
‘All of it is now     it is always now’  
—Toni Morrison (1987: 248) 
 
Representing History and Time 
In the U.S., as in Australia, there have recently been a number of attempts to 
articulate the claims of past injustices on the present, and determine the law’s relationship 
to these claims. Arguments have been made in legal, critical and cultural domains about 
both the nature of historical claims and the ways in which they might (and should) be 
resolved.2 In this paper I consider the 2006 case of In re African-American Slave 
Descendants, (hereafter “Slave Descendants”), which is the most recent in a group of 
reparations cases in which litigants sued for damages arising out of the historical 
injustices of slavery3. None of these cases has succeeded, but these very failures are 
worth examining for the contradictions they expose in the law’s narration of the past. 
While a number of law and literature scholars have drawn analogies between legal and 
literary practices of representation4, I am interested here in focusing on moments when 
the law self-consciously creates legal concepts. I loosely call this practice the creation of 
‘fictions’ in the law. The use of legal ‘fictions’ seems to have arisen implicitly in the 
reparations cases as a potential site for challenging not only legal, but also cultural 
understandings of contemporary responsibility for injustices of the past5.  
Throughout the twentieth century, historians challenged the idea that we have 
transparent access to historical truths, which has obvious implications for the status of the 
legal text; and yet the law itself has remained largely untouched by these insights. Critical 
legal theorists have challenged the law’s underlying assumptions, as well as its version of 
history; here I am suggesting that we turn our attention to the staging of history in literary 
works, and use literary arguments about history to intervene in the law’s logics. By the 
phrase ‘law’s logics,’ I mean the liberal, Enlightenment assumptions underpinning the 
law, (usually unstated), which have been the focus of critical scholarship6. Literature has 
much to offer this critical debate on historical injustices, due to both its similarities and 
differences to the law. The literature of historical injustice shares thematic concerns with 
the law such as the nature of trauma, time, and history; but one of the key differences 
between law and literature is literature’s self-awareness of its status as representation, 
which in the law is generally ignored or refused. Literature, then, becomes a place from 
which we might theorise history as a technique or argument about the world, a site from 
which we might explore the relationship between materiality and the representations 
produced in response to material conditions.  
 
The Case For An Alternative Representation of Legal Time 
In the 2006 Slave Descendants case, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit heard an action comprising ‘… class actions on behalf of all Americans 
descended from slaves’(at 7), against companies or their successors who had been slave-
owners, or who had provided services (such as insurance, finance and transportation) to 
 slave-owners (at 7-8). The claim was based on consumer protection law, tort and unjust 
enrichment. The lead Circuit Judge, Judge Posner, gave a number of reasons for 
dismissing the case, but in this essay I will focus on those reasons relating to the statute 
of limitations and equitable tolling, and the particular narrative of American history on 
which they rely.  
Courts adjudicating reparations cases have consistently held that plaintiffs are not 
entitled to sue because so much time has passed since the events of slavery, far exceeding 
the time permitted under statutes of limitations. However, the statue of limitations is an 
arbitrary creation; further, even within the terms of the principle, it is open to these courts 
to disregard the statute of limitations using the principle of equitable tolling, which 
recognizes that in some situations it is impossible for potential plaintiffs to make a claim. 
In Sandvik v. United States, the court formulated the principle as follows: 
equitable tolling is appropriate when a movant untimely files because of 
extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and 
unavoidable even with diligence (at 1271).  
In the context of litigation for damages arising out of the Holocaust, the statute of 
limitations was again tolled over many years in Bodner v. Banque Paribas because of 
‘extraordinary circumstances,’ the court stating: 
[o]ne example of an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ meriting equitable tolling 
may be where plaintiffs can show that it would have been impossible for a 
reasonably prudent person to learn or discover critical facts underlying their 
claim (at 135). 
In applying equitable tolling and disregarding the statute of limitations, the court 
recognises the specific, material realities in which the claim is made, including the 
historical context of the claim. And yet, the history of slavery and what followed do not 
count as ‘extraordinary circumstances’ in the Slave Descendants case: no consideration is 
given to the collective wrongdoing during slavery, nor to the effects of slavery and 
racism from 1865 onwards. During the Reconstruction period following the official end 
of slavery, and into the twentieth century, racism operated systematically, both outside 
the law’s boundaries—through practices such as lynching—but also as a matter of law, 
through cases such as Plessy v Ferguson, which upheld the constitutionality of racial 
segregation through the principle that the races were ‘separate but equal’. However, 
Judge Posner refused the availability of equitable tolling in Slave Descendants, arguing: 
… suits complaining about injuries that occurred more than a century and a 
half ago have been barred for a long time by the applicable state statutes of 
limitations. It is true that tolling doctrines can extend the time to sue well 
beyond the period of limitations—but not to a century and more beyond. 
Slaves could not sue, and even after the Thirteenth Amendment became 
effective in 1865 suits such as these, if brought in the South, would not have 
received a fair hearing. However, some northern courts would have been 
receptive to such suits, and since the defendants are (and were) northern 
companies, venue would have been proper in those states. Even in the 
South, descendants of slaves have had decades of effective access to the 
courts to seek redress for the wrongs of which they complain. And it's not as 
if it had been a deep mystery that corporations were involved in the 
operation of the slave system (at 24-5). 
 Although Posner admitted that slaves and ex-slaves ‘would not have received a fair 
hearing’ in the south, he insisted they could have made claims in the north. But Posner’s 
consideration of the hypothetical case in which a slave or ex-slave might have made a 
reparations case in the north before the statute of limitations expired ignores material 
historical conditions, especially the legal reality of the operation of racism in the courts 
following the official end of slavery. When Posner states that ‘descendants of slaves have 
had decades of effective access to the courts,’ he means that technical, formal access to 
the courts was available to African Americans. However, African Americans had little 
material access to the courts, and even when claims were made, they failed or were 
retracted: African Americans have been attempting to make reparations claims to 
unreceptive courts for a long time, since the post-Civil War demands for ‘forty acres and 
a mule’ (Ogletree 2003: 286-87; Gross 2008: 311-12). But for Posner, the only ‘deep 
mystery’ concerning the absence of reparations cases lies with the limited question of the 
state of knowledge of the plaintiffs, who should have obviously understood that 
‘corporations were involved with in the operation of the slave system’; rhetorically, this 
move allows to Posner to occlude other possibilities that explain the failure of these 
cases, such as failures of the legal system itself. The case reveals the incompatibility of 
two logics, each relying on two different kinds of history: the plaintiff’s history is 
materialist and new historicist, and argues the political and legal impossibility of staging 
reparations claims until a fairly recent point in time; the court’s (and the defendants’) is 
positivist and formal. It might seem tautological that the court’s representation of time is 
legal and formal; and yet, there is no legal necessity requiring the court to rely on such a 
restricted reading of time, which in turn narrates a particular history. This history is the 
classical liberal narrative of how things work, a history which denies the materiality and 
specificity of experience, and the operations of power arising out of race, class and 
gender. By failing to read legal and extra-legal racism across time as ‘extraordinary 
circumstances,’ the court not only excludes reparations for past suffering, but disguises 
the fact of the law’s historical complicity in these exclusions. It would be impossible to 
disentangle the law’s responsibility for racism from cultural responsibility: the effect of 
racism across time is an effect of both legal and extra-legal practices. However, as a 
matter of social justice, (as well as the arguably more narrow concept of legal justice), it 
is crucial that the law examines its narrative of the past and becomes aware of its own 
role in narrating a limited history. 
Although the judgments in the reparations cases explicitly deny alternatives to the 
law’s representations of history and time, the cases themselves, read in context, 
demonstrate contradictions in the law’s logic, and reveal the law’s complicity in the 
historical processes of slavery. Reparations claims—particularly those framed as unjust 
enrichment—reveal the enduring benefits of slavery to universities, corporations, 
insurance companies and the state, and show the articulation of capitalism with slavery, 
an articulation achieved with the complicity of law. The plaintiffs’ demands for an 
accounting of slavery by corporations, combined with the legal status of corporations as 
entities which are ‘immortal’ in time, reveal the historical, cultural and legal realities that 
slavery has endured across time, both materially and symbolically. This past-present 
connection makes contemporary social, political and economic domains clearly 
accountable to their roots in slavery: ethically, where collective benefit has accrued, 
collective responsibility should follow. The cases partly function as ethical and rhetorical 
 discourses—but they also directly challenge legal reasoning, revealing the contradiction 
of excluding some fictions while others flourish; and they reveal the materiality behind 
these discourses: the relationship between the word of law and material benefits to some, 
material suffering to others. Accordingly, in the following section I read Slave 
Descendants case alongside two fictions: the first is the law’s fiction of corporations; the 
second is Toni Morrison’s novel Beloved. 
 
Legal and Literary Fictions of Slavery 
It might seem strange to place a novel, which has been produced self-consciously 
as a work of fiction, in relation to a legal case, which seems to be anchored firmly in the 
‘real world’. And yet, law clearly possesses it own creations, which are sometimes 
recognised as fictions, but mostly are not; and these fictions have ‘real world’ effects. 
Ironically, painfully, the material and legal history of slavery reveals the fact that fiction 
resides in the law; reveals the ways in which the law is never static or positivist but 
always political, always changeable, always of its time; and always devising its own way 
of relating personhood, property, time and responsibility. The legal imagination created 
slaves as property, and created attendant fictions that transformed acts of the subject into 
properties of the object: for example, during slavery ‘marriage’ was a state unavailable to 
slaves; the agency of slaves who ran away was interpreted as a defect in property 
(Schafer 1987: 306); and the Fugitive Slave Act (1850) produced legal mechanics for the 
reclamation of runaway slaves, asserting property rights over subjects-who-were-objects. 
These legal creations developed in response to historical conditions, especially 
economics, and had the effect of minimising the costs and uncertainty of the slave trade, 
thus strengthening the institution of slavery (Schafer 1987: 310-16).  
In the reparations cases, plaintiffs sued corporate defendants in unjust enrichment, 
relying on the nature of corporations, which are the law’s creation and sometimes 
described as fictions. In law, corporations both are and are not the same entities now as 
they were two hundred years ago—company identities endure across time, but both 
courts and scholars argue the nature of this identity, and its ability to endure or change 
according to historical, material circumstances. This ambivalence about the status of the 
corporation as a ‘fiction’ is potentially productive for reparations claims: the continuing 
identity of corporations means plaintiffs can prove a connection between the benefits of 
slavery to these corporations into the present time; while the corporate identity’s 
relationship to materiality indicates the continuing material benefit of slavery into the 
present. In contrast to the law on slavery, the law at times staged its awareness of the 
corporation as a creation. John Marshall, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, 
expressed the legal imagination at work in relation to the corporation in the 1819 case 
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward: 
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in 
contemplation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only 
those  properties that the charter of its creation confers on it, either 
expressly, or as  incidental to its very existence. … Among the most 
important are immortality,  and … individuality … (at 634-35) 
According to this case, we must believe that the corporation is a ‘creature of law,’ but 
that it is not imaginary. And as a culture, we do. Entire economies and material 
circumstances rest on this story, while at the same time the fictional nature of the 
 corporation is kept in the background. The corporation occupies a place of being neither 
fiction nor reality—it is a kind of literal, material metaphor. 
Historically, the legal moves that made the enslaved person property, and the 
corporate entity a legal person, were interconnected in the law, as the courts battled out 
the nature of personhood. The 1886 case Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific 
Railroad Co. which involved two railway companies fighting over fence boundaries, was 
subsequently used by U.S. courts to extend the rights of corporations on the basis of them 
being read as natural persons under the 14th Amendment. Although the 14th amendment 
was written following the Civil War to guarantee the citizenship and liberty of freed 
slaves, it was used in court many more times by corporations than by African Americans.  
Although intimately part of the law’s history, legal creations produced for and 
alongside slavery have only been explicitly engaged by the law in small ways; the 
reparations cases are part of this engagement, and only because a small group of litigants 
has pushed against the law’s dominant narratives. In contrast, history and personhood 
have long been countered in literature by a number of novelists, who have taken on the 
dichotomies of property/personhood and past/present to hold that the historical injuries of 
slavery exist very much in the present. One of America’s most important contemporary 
writers, and recipient of the Nobel Prize in Literature, Toni Morrison, deals with the 
continuing legacies of slavery on the present in all her novels, but she most explicitly 
represents the history of slavery in Beloved. The project of imagining the past is 
necessary because the historical record before and after slavery is missing the narratives 
of slaves and ex-slaves. Morrison’s novels are fictions that challenge the assumptions of 
law and history; one of her primary aims in writing is to create and restore the stories of 
those whose experience and presence in the national narrative has been erased; erased 
because of the material conditions of slavery, because it was impossible or often illegal 
for slaves and ex-slaves to be educated, and because of the resistance of the dominant 
culture to the challenges posed by these narratives. Morrison’s fictions about the past 
push against the fictions of dominant politics and culture, which pretend that a liberal 
version of history is an inclusive, true history. As can be seen from Posner’s comments in 
the Slave Descendents case, the law relies on this dominant, liberal version of history. 
The novel originated in the real-life incidents of a runaway slave, Margaret Garner, who 
in 1856 killed her own child to keep it out of the hands of her pursuing owner. The act at 
the centre of the novel—the act of murder by Sethe (Garner’s literary counterpart)—is 
simultaneously an act of destruction of property. Morrison uses this dichotomy to work 
through the paradoxical and traumatic effects of slavery on subjects, who lived at the 
intersection of property and personhood, not only during slavery but afterward. Morrison 
demonstrates that after the point at which slavery ends in law, slavery continues—as a 
matter of law, as well as culturally and socially. Property and personhood are articulated 
under slavery laws, and this connection is not easily dissolved: the effects continue 
through Jim Crow laws, enacted at state and local level between 1876 and 1965, which 
provided for segregation under the ‘separate but equal’ principle of Plessy v. Ferguson; 
and out of structural racism, into the present. 
Morrison’s literary call to responsibility is met in law by the plaintiffs in the case 
of Slave Descendants. By way of relief, the claimants demanded an accounting and 
disgorgement of the profits arising from companies’ dealings with slave-owners to the 
class members (at 7-8). This call to provide an account is a call to responsibility in a 
 number of ways, as reading accounts yields the narratives, poetics and politics of the 
continuing effects of slavery: further, it is a way to connect this responsibility with the 
continuing material benefits of the historical institution of slavery with the continuing, 
‘immortal’ entity of the corporation. The account book records the material and symbolic 
transformation and equation of human beings into monetary value, demonstrating the 
‘epistemic violence’ of the institution (Dussere 2001: 333), and revealing what Hortense 
Spillers calls the ‘grammar’ of property-personhood-commodity (1987: 79). The effects 
of this logic are shown in Morrison's own version of the ledger, the chart which the slave 
owner, Schoolteacher, asks his students to keep concerning the slaves: 
[P] ut her human characteristics on the left; her animal ones on the right. 
And don't forget to line them up (193).  
In demanding an account of the benefits of slavery, claimants in Slave Descendants  are 
also demanding a recounting of slavery, thereby demonstrating the articulation of the 
material and symbolic, an articulation that has always been at the heart of the law. The 
demands of reparationists towards firms who historically benefited from slavery to 
provide an account for the profits of slavery is not just symbolic—or if it is, it shows 
what we already know, that money, value and materiality are both symbolic and real, are 
processes of reading and interpretation; and that often our division of the ‘real’ and the 
‘imaginary’ are arbitrary, selective and motivated. Further, this claim is a claim that 
reveals the connection between responsibility and representation: the demand for 
accounting and recounting the material benefits of slavery is a call to justice at the levels 
of both narrative and materiality. 
 
Whose History? Whose Time? Whose Law? 
Legal scholars responding to the call of recent reparations cases have 
demonstrated how claims may be made in consumer law7, constitutional law8, and unjust 
enrichment9. In doing so, they use the specificity of the history of slavery to read the 
injustices of the law’s fictions; and they use the law’s faulty logic against itself. The 
potential of the common law is that it combines an interpretation of the past, through 
precedent, with a creative incorporation of new circumstances and the hope of these 
reparations claims is that the common law will include different readings of history, time 
and responsibility as new circumstances. The history tacitly represented and silently 
justified in current legal representations is the liberal history of the majority, who 
historically benefited from the conditions of slavery and who continue to benefit. The 
injuries of slavery become visible under a different kind of history than the law is used to 
serving. Culturally, politically and legally, we’re always choosing which injuries to 
recognise, represent and compensate, and which to ignore. These choices are produced 
explicitly and vocally sometimes—by those who clearly denounce the justice of 
reparations, for example—and subtly and implicitly at other times—through the technical 
categories of limitations and tolling. As a system of representing and organising the real 
world, the law relies on metaphors and fictions; there’s nothing wrong with that, but 
there’s something wrong with failing to acknowledge and come to terms with the specific 
choices of whose fictions and whose histories are represented in these representations; 
whose law is being applied. A certain kind of legal imagination has so far disallowed 
recognition for the continuing harms of the past; another kind of legal imagination could 
recognise these claims, and in doing so reclaim an entirely new history for the law. 
 And yet, the final contradiction of the case lies in the contrast between the 
expression and containment of these claims. Their presence in the record of the law 
clearly exposes contradictions in the law’s logics; but on the other hand, these 
contradictions are so easily resolved by these same logics. An authentic resolution of 
these contradictions—a recognition of the sort of time that is operating, and of the 
various fictions upon which the law relies—would produce a significant move of self-
reflexivity in the law that would effectively undo the liberal logics and assumptions upon 
which the legal system is based. Paradoxically, these cases stand in the law as a radical 
challenge—and yet they’re so easily shut down within the law. Can the law, then, 
become the site for the pursuit of social justice concerning injustices of the past? It seems 
important that claimants continue to pursue these cases, insisting on the materiality of the 
injuries of the past. It also seems important that we pay attention to alternative sites of 
adjudication—such as literary works—which judge law and culture’s relationship to the 
past, and provide a site from which to theorise law’s relationship to history.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Research Fellow, Society of Scholars, Walter Chapin Simpson Center for the Humanities, University of 
Washington. I would like to thank the anonymous readers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of 
this paper, and the Simpson Center for supporting my research. 
2 In Australia, the most prominent case is Mabo v Queensland (No. 2), in which the High Court ruled that 
indigenous land rights survived the acquisition of sovereignty by Britain, and that the previously held 
doctrine of ‘terra nullius’ was both legally and historically incorrect. Culturally, the historical relationship 
of both indigenous and non-indigenous Australians to land has been adjudicated in a number of ways, most 
recently in novels by Kate Grenville (The Secret River) and Alexis Wright (Carpentaria).  
3 A number of reparations claims have been made recently but in this paper I will focus on the case In re 
African-American Slave Descendants Litigation as these cases represent the first substantive legal opinions 
on reparations in a federal court. For a summary of recent reparations claims and legislative initiatives at 
local, state and federal levels, see Ogletree 2003. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. is a Harvard professor and a key 
figure in the formulation of reparations claims.  
4 Binder and Weisberg provide a thorough, critical summary of the law and literature movement in their 
work Literary Criticisms of Law. Binder and Weisberg employ a cultural studies approach to draw attention 
to the similarities between, on the one hand, imagination as a ‘meaning-making function that pervades 
social life’ (2000: 5), and, on the other hand, law as ‘more broadly … an ordering function, a process of 
identifying, allocating and contesting authority, that pervades all spheres of social life’ (2000: 5). In law, as 
in literature, fiction functions as a device or argument that orders the world.  
5 In the Australian context, ‘fiction’ became a key term through which to challenge the prevailing legal 
understanding of Australian law and its relationship to history in the Mabo judgment; for example, Chief 
Justice Brennan held: ‘The fiction by which the rights and interests of indigenous inhabitants in land were 
treated as non-existent was justified by a policy which has no place in the contemporary law of this 
country’ (at 42). 
6 There is a significant body of critical literature which challenges the liberal version of American history 
and law’s complicity with this narrative—a narrative which is relevant to the reparations cases because, for 
                                                                                                                                                  
example, it produces an abstract understanding of individual will, a strategy which disguises the material 
realities of racism. See, in particular, Best, Hartman and Spillers.   
7 For an elaboration of the potential of the consumer fraud argument in the case In re African-American 
Slave Descendants Litigation, see Ramchandani 2003. 
8 Wenger argues that slavery violated the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. Using the 
liberal logic of self-ownership against itself, Wenger argues that when the government made laws that 
established and maintained slavery, it appropriated the property of self-ownership of the slaves; 
accordingly, the rightful owners of this property suffered uncompensated takings and so are constitutionally 
entitled to compensation under the Takings Clause (2003: 192). 
9 For reparations claims based on unjust enrichment, see Dagan (2003); Posner and Vermeule (2003); and 
Sherwin (2004). Posner and Vermeule argue that ‘because the victim and claimant do not need to be the 
same person … the restitution argument provides a stronger case for reparations than the compensation 
argument does’ (2003: 703). For a description of the debates concerning unjust enrichment see Sherwin 
(2004); Sherwin ultimately argues that restitution claims do not carry sufficient ‘moral force’ to carry 
reparations claims (2004: 1444), being based on principles of ‘revenge’ and ‘retaliation’ (2004: 1465); 
Sherwin therefore advocates claims based on compensation rather than unjust enrichment (2004: 1465). My 
concern here is not with technical or ethical debates concerning the desirability of restitution-based claims 
for reparations, but with legal and cultural ideas of time that led to the failure of the claim in the Supreme 
Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
